Friday, January 24, 2020
Essay on the Use of Profanity by William Shakespeare :: Biography Biographies Essays
Use of Profanity by Shakespeare     The evolution of written profanity began roughly in the sixteenth century, and continues to change with each generation that it sees. Profanity is recognized in many Shakespearean works, and has continually evolved into the profane language used today. Some cuss words have somehow maintained their original meanings throughout hundreds of years, while many others have completely changed meaning or simply fallen out of use.             William Shakespeare, though it is not widely taught, was not a very clean writer. In fact, he was somewhat of a potty mouth. His works encompassed a lot of things that some people wish he had not. "That includes a fair helping of sex, violence, crime, horror, politics, religion, anti-authoritarianism, anti-semitism, racism, xenophobia, sexism, jealousy, profanity, satire, and controversy of all kinds" (Macrone 6). In his time, religious and moral curses were more offensive than biological curses. Most all original (before being censored) Shakespearean works contain very offensive profanity, mostly religious, which is probably one of many reasons that his works were and are so popular. "Shakespeare pushed a lot of buttons in his day- which is one reason he was so phenomenally popular. Despite what they tell you, people like having their buttons pushed" (Macrone 6). Because his works contained so many of these profane words or phrases, they were censored to protect the innocent minds of the teenagers who are required to read them, and also because they were blasphemous and offensive. Almost all of the profanity was removed, and that that was not had just reason for being there. Some of the Bard's censored oaths are;             "God's blessing on your beard"            Love's Labors Lost, II.i.203             This was a very rude curse because a man's facial hair was a point of pride for him. and "to play with someone's beard" was to insult him.             "God's body"            1 Henry IV,II.i.26            Swearing by Christ's body, (or any part thereof,) was off limits in civil discourse.            "God's Bod(y)kins, man"            Hamlet, II.ii.529              The word bod(y)kin means "little body" or "dear body," but adding the cute little suffix does not make this curse any more acceptable.             "By God's [blest] mother!"            2 Henry VI, II.i;            3 Henry VI, III.ii;            Henry VIII, V.i             Swearing by the virgin was almost as rude as swearing by her son, especially when addressing a catholic cathedral as Gloucester did in 2 Henry VI, II.
Wednesday, January 15, 2020
The Haqqani Network: Terrorists or Insurgents
The definition of terrorism is broad and open to interpretation. Hoffman, in his book Inside Terrorism, suggests that terrorism is â€Å"the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. †Schwartz, Dunkel, et al, define terrorism in their Studies in Conflict & Terrorism article entitled Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective, as â€Å"the deliberate targeting of civilian sites for attacks designed to result in destruction of those sites and/or the injury and death of noncombatant civilians. Together, these two perspectives coupled with identity theory and will serve as the basis for an evaluation of the Haqqani network and their interrelationships and interactions with known terrorist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qa’ida as well as with Pakistan’s military and government intelligence agencies.The Haqqani Network: Who Are They and Why do We Care? The Haqqani network is an Af ghan and Pakistani group of fighters that operates primarily in southeastern Afghanistan as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban with close ties to Pakistan’s Army and intelligence agencies (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. -2). The Haqqani network’s leadership structure is hierarchical in nature with members of the patriarch’s family filling top leadership roles (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. 7). This familial structure is an important cultural identity marker â€Å"that can serve to promote terrorist activities. †Furthermore, Schwartz, Dunkel, et al address the family as it relates to upholding honor and â€Å"avenging wrongs done to the family. †This is interesting because even those who sympathize and support terrorism, but don’t actually participate in it, often share the same level of social identity based upon their group affiliations.This tends to show how the Haqqani network is able to exert its influence over their colle ague groups without actually having to be in control of them. It appears to be a symbiotic relationship where the Haqqani network clearly benefits from bi-directional credibility of association with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. Rassler et al support this claim when they discuss the relationship between senior Haqqani network leaders and their close operational relationships with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, revealing that there is often no distinction.This shared identity-based connection legitimizes the Haqqani network with the segment of the Afghan society that believes in radical Islam and jihad. This was evidenced when the Haqqani network helped â€Å"sustain al-Qa’ida’s relevance and branding as the leader of the global jihadist movement. †All in all, it appears the Haqqani network just wants their proverbial place at the table so to speak. Clearly, it must be working, as current assessments put the strength of the group close to 15,000 fighters. The Haqqani Network: Duplicity at WorkAmerican intelligence and military officials claim the Haqqani network is a â€Å"proxy force used by the Pakistani intelligence service [Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence {ISI} agency] to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks. †The question here is whether this is a relationship of convenience or an alliance due to shared identity. The secret relationship with ISI coupled with links to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban clearly shows the need to solicit support (e. g. , material, financial, spiritual, etc. ) and ultimately rally the masses behind them.Furthermore, â€Å"for decades, [the Haqqani network has been] a mentor to Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Turkish, and Pakistani jihadists. †These associations speak to the core of shared identity and the interactions among the groups, as according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al social and cultural identity is formed when members come together based upon common beliefs shared across the group, and individual identity represents personally chosen goals, values, and beliefs coupled with their perspectives of the world around them.The study of terrorism necessitates (according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al) that we not only understand the effects of identity, but also the interactions among these levels. In addition, we need to look at the importance of the wider community as Schwartz, Dunkel, et al put it, â€Å"Without local, and sometimes international support, those engaged in terrorist attacks would find it substantially more difficult, if not impossible, to conduct their activities. †Working with the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and Pakistan’s ISI is a duplicitous role that provides â€Å"credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad†(Rassler et al.July 14, 2011, p. 5) establishing the shared identity necessary to imbue respect and connectivity as part of an influential group dynamic. Why is all this important? The Haqqani ne twork’s credibility in the region, especially with the tribal groups of Afghanistan, helps extend the Taliban’s reach and because the Haqqani network is effective militarily, they act as a force multiplier for the Taliban. This puts the Haqqani network in a regional leadership position, and Schwartz, Dunkel, et al suggest that this leadership role would be considered admirable providing further social capital.The Haqqani Network: Terrorist Threat or Insurgency? So with such a significant fighting force that is radicalized, is the Haqqani network a terrorist organization pitted against Western ideology, or is it simply an insurgency focused on eradicating outsiders who have forced their way into the Afghani homeland? According to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State as of September 15, 2011, the Haqqani network is not listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Despite this, according to the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor , â€Å"The U.S. military has long been frustrated by deadly operations carried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces. †They quote U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying, â€Å"We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the border attacking our forces and [Afghans] and disappearing back into a safe haven [in Pakistan]. †In between the rhetoric, the real reason they aren’t on the terrorist list is because there is a belief that, â€Å"such a move would scuttle any chances that the group might make peace with Afghanistan’s government. To make our decision, it is essential that we not lose sight of the need to fairly evaluate this group from the point of view of that group and not from the â€Å"Westernized†framework we can easily apply to it. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, point out that, â€Å"Scholars’ insistence that ‘terrorists’ are somehow ‘not like us’ but, instead, abnorma lâ€â€insane, power hungry, or a combination of bothâ€â€is a classic exercise in out-group stereotyping†¦which undermines the analytical utility of the interpretations in use. Applying this to the Haqqani network and to prevent us from being constrained by our (Western) cultural boundaries, it is incumbent upon us to look at the Haqqani network from their vantage point. The clearest and most-recent message came in September of 2011 when Sirajuddin Haqqani (the son of the group’s patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani) told The Telegraph in the United Kingdom via a telephone interview, â€Å"There are sincere people in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces. With this, their actions, and their relationships, it is apparent that the Haqqani network is interested more in the local issues and having local influence than it is in trying to wage a global jihad against the W est. A such, their lack of inclusion from the list of terrorist organizations is still valid. Bibliography Brannan, David W. , Esler, Philip F. , and Strindberg, N. T. Anders. 2001. â€Å"Talking to â€Å"Terrorists†: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. †Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1: 3-24. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, â€Å"About the Haqqani network. Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http://news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network Griffin, Emory. A First Look at Communication Theory. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, â€Å"Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. †Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http://www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal- haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all.Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida. †Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2011. www. ctc. usma. edu. Shahzad, Faizul. â€Å"Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship. †Terrorism Monitor. 9. no. 37 (2011): 1-2. http://www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November 10, 2011). Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. Websites Referenced http://www. cfr. org http://www. tc. usma. edu http://www. dawn. com http://www. foreignaffairs. com http://www. jamestown. org http://news. nationalpost. com http://www. nytimes. com/ http://www. state. gov http://www. telegraph. co. uk http://www. thedailybeast. com http://tribune. com. pk h ttp://www. understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network â€â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€œ [ 1 ]. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. p. 40. [ 2 ]. Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 537-559. 3 ]. Ibid (p. 540)â€â€Identity theory for our purposes will cover cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity. [ 4 ]. Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida. †Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. [ 5 ]. The Haqqani network’s patriarch and leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani, although it is reported that he may be in ill health, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is running the day-to-day opera tions. http://www. cfr. org/afghanistan/institute-study-war-haqqani-network/p26126 [ 6 ].Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 542. [ 7 ]. Ibid. [ 8 ]. Ibid (p. 548) [ 9 ]. Much like the traditional phrase, â€Å"guilt by association,†I suggest there could be credibility by association. It is concept that is often discussed in marketing whereby a person, product, or company gains credibility by associating itself with a larger more recognized person, product, or company (e. g. , a computer with the â€Å"Intel Inside†sticker on it). [ 10 ]. Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown.The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida. †Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 40) [ 11 ]. Ibid (p. 43). [ 12 ]. http://tribune. com. pk/story/259314/sirajuddin-haqqani-dares-us-to-atta ck-n-waziristan/ [ 13 ]. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, â€Å"Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. †Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http://www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all. [ 14 ].Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. p. 199. [ 15 ]. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, â€Å"About the Haqqani network. †Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http://news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network [ 16 ]. Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. [ 17 ]. Ibid. [ 18 ]. Ibid (p. 548) [ 19 ]. Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa' ida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 13) [ 20 ]. Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 550. [ 21 ]. The current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations contains 49 entries, but the Haqqani Network is not one of them. http://www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085. htm [ 22 ]. Faizul Shahzad, â€Å"Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship,†Terrorism Monitor, 9, no. 37 (2011): 1-2, http://www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November
The Haqqani Network: Terrorists or Insurgents
The definition of terrorism is broad and open to interpretation. Hoffman, in his book Inside Terrorism, suggests that terrorism is â€Å"the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. †Schwartz, Dunkel, et al, define terrorism in their Studies in Conflict & Terrorism article entitled Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective, as â€Å"the deliberate targeting of civilian sites for attacks designed to result in destruction of those sites and/or the injury and death of noncombatant civilians. Together, these two perspectives coupled with identity theory and will serve as the basis for an evaluation of the Haqqani network and their interrelationships and interactions with known terrorist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qa’ida as well as with Pakistan’s military and government intelligence agencies.The Haqqani Network: Who Are They and Why do We Care? The Haqqani network is an Af ghan and Pakistani group of fighters that operates primarily in southeastern Afghanistan as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban with close ties to Pakistan’s Army and intelligence agencies (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. -2). The Haqqani network’s leadership structure is hierarchical in nature with members of the patriarch’s family filling top leadership roles (Rassler et al. July 14, 2011, p. 7). This familial structure is an important cultural identity marker â€Å"that can serve to promote terrorist activities. †Furthermore, Schwartz, Dunkel, et al address the family as it relates to upholding honor and â€Å"avenging wrongs done to the family. †This is interesting because even those who sympathize and support terrorism, but don’t actually participate in it, often share the same level of social identity based upon their group affiliations.This tends to show how the Haqqani network is able to exert its influence over their colle ague groups without actually having to be in control of them. It appears to be a symbiotic relationship where the Haqqani network clearly benefits from bi-directional credibility of association with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. Rassler et al support this claim when they discuss the relationship between senior Haqqani network leaders and their close operational relationships with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, revealing that there is often no distinction.This shared identity-based connection legitimizes the Haqqani network with the segment of the Afghan society that believes in radical Islam and jihad. This was evidenced when the Haqqani network helped â€Å"sustain al-Qa’ida’s relevance and branding as the leader of the global jihadist movement. †All in all, it appears the Haqqani network just wants their proverbial place at the table so to speak. Clearly, it must be working, as current assessments put the strength of the group close to 15,000 fighters. The Haqqani Network: Duplicity at WorkAmerican intelligence and military officials claim the Haqqani network is a â€Å"proxy force used by the Pakistani intelligence service [Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence {ISI} agency] to carry out grisly, high-profile attacks. †The question here is whether this is a relationship of convenience or an alliance due to shared identity. The secret relationship with ISI coupled with links to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban clearly shows the need to solicit support (e. g. , material, financial, spiritual, etc. ) and ultimately rally the masses behind them.Furthermore, â€Å"for decades, [the Haqqani network has been] a mentor to Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Turkish, and Pakistani jihadists. †These associations speak to the core of shared identity and the interactions among the groups, as according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al social and cultural identity is formed when members come together based upon common beliefs shared across the group, and individual identity represents personally chosen goals, values, and beliefs coupled with their perspectives of the world around them.The study of terrorism necessitates (according to Schwartz, Dunkel, et al) that we not only understand the effects of identity, but also the interactions among these levels. In addition, we need to look at the importance of the wider community as Schwartz, Dunkel, et al put it, â€Å"Without local, and sometimes international support, those engaged in terrorist attacks would find it substantially more difficult, if not impossible, to conduct their activities. †Working with the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and Pakistan’s ISI is a duplicitous role that provides â€Å"credibility within, and across, multiple dimensions of jihad†(Rassler et al.July 14, 2011, p. 5) establishing the shared identity necessary to imbue respect and connectivity as part of an influential group dynamic. Why is all this important? The Haqqani ne twork’s credibility in the region, especially with the tribal groups of Afghanistan, helps extend the Taliban’s reach and because the Haqqani network is effective militarily, they act as a force multiplier for the Taliban. This puts the Haqqani network in a regional leadership position, and Schwartz, Dunkel, et al suggest that this leadership role would be considered admirable providing further social capital.The Haqqani Network: Terrorist Threat or Insurgency? So with such a significant fighting force that is radicalized, is the Haqqani network a terrorist organization pitted against Western ideology, or is it simply an insurgency focused on eradicating outsiders who have forced their way into the Afghani homeland? According to the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the Department of State as of September 15, 2011, the Haqqani network is not listed as a foreign terrorist organization. Despite this, according to the Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor , â€Å"The U.S. military has long been frustrated by deadly operations carried out against its troops in Afghanistan by Haqqani Network forces. †They quote U. S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta as saying, â€Å"We cannot have the Haqqanis coming across the border attacking our forces and [Afghans] and disappearing back into a safe haven [in Pakistan]. †In between the rhetoric, the real reason they aren’t on the terrorist list is because there is a belief that, â€Å"such a move would scuttle any chances that the group might make peace with Afghanistan’s government. To make our decision, it is essential that we not lose sight of the need to fairly evaluate this group from the point of view of that group and not from the â€Å"Westernized†framework we can easily apply to it. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, point out that, â€Å"Scholars’ insistence that ‘terrorists’ are somehow ‘not like us’ but, instead, abnorma lâ€â€insane, power hungry, or a combination of bothâ€â€is a classic exercise in out-group stereotyping†¦which undermines the analytical utility of the interpretations in use. Applying this to the Haqqani network and to prevent us from being constrained by our (Western) cultural boundaries, it is incumbent upon us to look at the Haqqani network from their vantage point. The clearest and most-recent message came in September of 2011 when Sirajuddin Haqqani (the son of the group’s patriarch, Jalaluddin Haqqani) told The Telegraph in the United Kingdom via a telephone interview, â€Å"There are sincere people in the Afghan government who are loyal to the Taliban as they know our goal is the liberation of our homeland from the clutches of occupying forces. With this, their actions, and their relationships, it is apparent that the Haqqani network is interested more in the local issues and having local influence than it is in trying to wage a global jihad against the W est. A such, their lack of inclusion from the list of terrorist organizations is still valid. Bibliography Brannan, David W. , Esler, Philip F. , and Strindberg, N. T. Anders. 2001. â€Å"Talking to â€Å"Terrorists†: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. †Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1: 3-24. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, â€Å"About the Haqqani network. Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http://news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network Griffin, Emory. A First Look at Communication Theory. New York: The McGraw-Hill Companies, 1997. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, â€Å"Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. †Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http://www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal- haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all.Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida. †Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2011. www. ctc. usma. edu. Shahzad, Faizul. â€Å"Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship. †Terrorism Monitor. 9. no. 37 (2011): 1-2. http://www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November 10, 2011). Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. Websites Referenced http://www. cfr. org http://www. tc. usma. edu http://www. dawn. com http://www. foreignaffairs. com http://www. jamestown. org http://news. nationalpost. com http://www. nytimes. com/ http://www. state. gov http://www. telegraph. co. uk http://www. thedailybeast. com http://tribune. com. pk h ttp://www. understandingwar. org/themenode/haqqani-network â€â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€Ã¢â‚¬â€œ [ 1 ]. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. p. 40. [ 2 ]. Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 537-559. 3 ]. Ibid (p. 540)â€â€Identity theory for our purposes will cover cultural identity, social identity, and personal identity. [ 4 ]. Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida. †Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. [ 5 ]. The Haqqani network’s patriarch and leader is Jalaluddin Haqqani, although it is reported that he may be in ill health, and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is running the day-to-day opera tions. http://www. cfr. org/afghanistan/institute-study-war-haqqani-network/p26126 [ 6 ].Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 542. [ 7 ]. Ibid. [ 8 ]. Ibid (p. 548) [ 9 ]. Much like the traditional phrase, â€Å"guilt by association,†I suggest there could be credibility by association. It is concept that is often discussed in marketing whereby a person, product, or company gains credibility by associating itself with a larger more recognized person, product, or company (e. g. , a computer with the â€Å"Intel Inside†sticker on it). [ 10 ]. Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown.The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida. †Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 40) [ 11 ]. Ibid (p. 43). [ 12 ]. http://tribune. com. pk/story/259314/sirajuddin-haqqani-dares-us-to-atta ck-n-waziristan/ [ 13 ]. Mazzetti, Mark, Scott Shane, and Alissa Rubin. New York Times, â€Å"Brutal Haqqani Crime Clan Bedevils U. S. in Afghanistan. †Last modified September 24, 2011. Accessed November 23, 2011. http://www. nytimes. com/2011/09/25/world/asia/brutal-haqqani-clan-bedevils-united-states-in-afghanistan. html? pagewanted=all. [ 14 ].Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism (2nd ed. ). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. p. 199. [ 15 ]. Goodspeed, Peter. National Post, â€Å"About the Haqqani network. †Last modified September 30, 2011. Accessed November 24, 2011. http://news. nationalpost. com/2011/09/30/about-the-haqqani-network [ 16 ]. Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 540. [ 17 ]. Ibid. [ 18 ]. Ibid (p. 548) [ 19 ]. Rassler, Don, and Vahid Brown. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, â€Å"The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa' ida. Last modified July 14, 2011. Accessed November 12, 2011, www. ctc. usma. edu. (p. 13) [ 20 ]. Schwartz, S. J. , Dunkel, C. S. , & Waterman, A. S. (2009). Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(6), 550. [ 21 ]. The current list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations contains 49 entries, but the Haqqani Network is not one of them. http://www. state. gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085. htm [ 22 ]. Faizul Shahzad, â€Å"Taliban Reject American Perceptions of the Haqqani-ISI Relationship,†Terrorism Monitor, 9, no. 37 (2011): 1-2, http://www. jamestown. org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue37. pdf (accessed November
Tuesday, January 7, 2020
Psychological and Moral Problem - Free Essay Example
Sample details Pages: 2 Words: 471 Downloads: 3 Date added: 2017/09/23 Category Advertising Essay Type Narrative essay Did you like this example? Summary on Disobedience as a Psychological and Moral Problem People have said that â€Å"obedience is a virtue and that disobedience is a vice,†for centuries. History of the humankind was started by an act of disobedience and it is not very unlikely that it will end by an act of obedience. Adam and Eve, being part of nature in the Garden Of Eden, had disobeyed an order. By disobeying the order they made man emerge â€Å"from a pre-human harmony and was able to take the first step into independence and freedom†as Fromm says. Adam and Eve were set free after the act of disobedience that broke the bond between nature and made man individuals. For man to become fully human and to learn all of their capabilities they had to leave the Garden of Eden. Prophets had said that man had not been corrupted by the sins but were freed by the pre human harmony. History is when man becomes human, â€Å"during its unfolding he develops his powers of reason and of love until he creates a new harmony between himself, his fellow man and nature†says Fromm. The â€Å"end of days†is what the new harmony is it’s the period of time where there is peace between man and man and man and nature. Prometheus had also did an act of disobedience, he had stolen fire from they gods and gave it to the people. Unlike Adam and Eve, he did not ask for forgiveness or repent, Instead, he said â€Å"I would rather be chained to this rock than be the obedient servant of the gods. †Man will ruin itself if all they do is obey, they would follow hate, greed, and fear. Fromm says, â€Å"If a man can only obey and not disobey, he is a slave; if he can only disobey and not obey, he is a rebel (not a revolutionary). †If man follows his own judgement rather then that of others then he is being â€Å"himself. †There are two types of conscience: the authoritarian conscience which is the internalized voice of authority that we are eager to please and are afraid to displease; and the humanistic conscience which is the voice that calls us back to ourselves. People try to force obedience but it does have disadvantages like the people rebelling and overthrowing whomever is trying to force the obedience. Fromm says that â€Å"Man must want an even need to obey, instead of only fearing to disobey†, so there is no chaos and man can finally accept obedience and not just disobedience. In ending, man has lost the awareness of himself obeying and disobeying. Fromm says â€Å"At this point in history the capacity to doubt, to criticize and to disobey may be all that stands between a future for mankind and the end of civilization. †Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "Psychological and Moral Problem" essay for you Create order
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